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In this paper, we examine the impact of China's growth on developing countries that specialize in manufacturing.
Over 2000-2005, manufacturing accounted for 32% of China's GDP and 89% of its merchandise exports,
making it more specialized in the sector than any other large developing economy.  Using the gravity
model of trade, we decompose bilateral trade into components associated with demand conditions
in importing countries, supply conditions in exporting countries, and bilateral trade costs.  We identify
10 developing economies for which manufacturing represents more than 75% of merchandise exports
(Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and
Turkey), which are in theory the countries most exposed to the adverse consequences of China's export
growth.  Our results suggest that had China's export supply capacity been constant over the 1995-2005
period, demand for exports would have been 0.8% to 1.6% higher in the 10 countries studied.  Thus,
even for the developing countries most specialized in export manufacturing, China's expansion has
represented only a modest negative shock.
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1.  Introduction 
  The explosive growth of China’s economy has been extraordinary.  Between 1990 and 
2005, China’s exports increased by 25 times in real terms, compared to an increase of about four 
times in the 12 largest exporting nations (Table 1).  As of 2005, China’s exports accounted for 
25% of the total exports of all countries outside of the top 12.
1 
  What has made China’s emergence potentially disruptive is that the country is highly 
specialized in manufacturing.  Over the period 2000 to 2005, manufacturing accounted for 32% 
of China’s GDP and 89% of its merchandise exports, making it more specialized in the sector 
than any other large developing economy (Table 2).  In consumer goods and other labor-
intensive manufactures, China has become a major source of supply, pushing down world 
product prices.  Meanwhile, China has contributed to a boom in demand for commodities, 
leading to increases in the prices of metals, minerals, and farm goods. 
  The impact of China’s emergence on other developing countries is just beginning to be 
appreciated (Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005; Eichengreen and Tong, 2005; 
Lopez Cordoba, Micco, and Molina, 2005).  In the 1980s and 1990s, international trade became 
the engine of growth for much of the developing world.  Trade liberalization and market-oriented 
reform in Asia and Latin America steered the regions toward greater specialization in exports.  
There is a popular conception that for non-oil-exporting developing countries expanding export 
production has meant specializing in manufacturing.  But in actuality there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the production structures of these economies, which means there is variation in 
national exposure to China’s industrial expansion. 
                                                 
1 This share excludes Hong Kong and Singapore, which are entrepot economies and whose exports contain a 
substantial share of re-exports.   2
  Even excluding oil exporters and very poor countries, there are many countries that 
specialize in primary commodities.  In Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Peru, for instance, 
manufacturing accounts for less than 25% of merchandise exports (Table 2).  One might expect 
this group to have been most helped by China’s growth, with the commodity boom lifting their 
terms of trade.  Other countries have diversified export production, spanning agriculture, mining, 
and manufacturing.  In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, and Vietnam, 
manufacturing accounts for 30% to 55% of merchandise exports.  For this group, China may 
represent a mixed blessing, increasing the prices of some of the goods they produce and 
decreasing the prices of others.  A third group of countries is highly specialized in 
manufacturing.  In Hungary, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Turkey, manufacturing 
accounts for more than 80% of merchandise exports.  This last group includes the countries most 
likely to be adversely affected by China, as it has become a rival source of supply in their 
primary destination markets.  Between 1993 and 2005, China’s share of total imports rose from 
5% to 15% in the United States and from 4% to 12% in the European Union. 
  In this paper, we examine the impact of China’s growth on developing countries that 
specialize in export manufacturing.  Using the gravity model of trade, we decompose bilateral 
trade into components associated with demand conditions in importing countries, supply 
conditions in exporting countries, and bilateral trade costs.  In theory, growth in China’s export-
supply capabilities would allow it to capture market share in the countries to which it exports its 
output, possibly reducing demand for imports from other countries that also supply these 
markets.  We calculate the export demand shock that China’s growth has meant for other 
developing countries, as implied by gravity model estimation results.   3
  To isolate economies that are most exposed to China’s manufacturing exports, we select 
developing countries that are also highly specialized in manufacturing.  After dropping rich 
countries, very poor countries, and small countries, we identify 10 medium-to-large developing 
economies for which manufacturing represents more than 75% of merchandise exports:   
Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
and Turkey.
2  This group includes a diverse set of countries in terms of geography and stage of 
development, hopefully making our results broadly applicable.  We focus on developing 
countries specialized in manufacturing, as for this group the impact of China on their production 
activities is largely captured by trade in manufactures.  Manufacturing is also a sector for which 
the gravity model is well suited theoretically. 
  In section 2, we use a standard monopolistic-competition model of trade to develop an 
estimation framework.  The specification is a regression of bilateral sectoral imports on importer 
country dummies, exporter country dummies, and factors that affect trade costs (bilateral 
distance, sharing a land border, sharing a common language, belonging to a free trade area, and 
import tariffs).  When these importer and exporter dummies are allowed to vary by sector and by 
year, they can be interpreted as functions of structural parameters and country-specific variables 
that determine a country’s export supply and import demand.  Changes in import-demand 
conditions can be decomposed into two parts, one of which captures changes in income levels in 
import markets and another of which captures changes in sectoral import price indices for those 
markets, which are themselves a function of other countries’ export-supply dummies. 
  In section 3, we report coefficient estimates based on our framework.  The data for the 
analysis come from the UN COMTRADE database and the TRAINS dataset, which cover the 
                                                 
2 In Table 2, it is apparent India would also satisfy our criteria.  We exclude India because its recent growth 
represents another potentially important global economic shock for other developing countries.   4
period to 1995 to 2005.  We estimate country-sector-year import dummies, country-sector-year 
export dummies, and sector-year trade cost elasticities using data on a large set of trading 
economies that account for much of world trade.  We begin by reporting estimated sectoral 
exporter dummy variables for the 10 developing-country exporters vis-à-vis China.  For 9 of the 
10 countries, export supply dummies are strongly positively correlated with China’s, suggesting 
that their comparative advantage is relatively similar to that of China.  The results also describe 
how each country’s export-supply capacities have evolved over time.  Relative to each of the 10 
countries, the growth in China’s export supply capabilities has been dramatic.     
  The main results, presented in section 4, suggest that had China’s export-supply capacity 
been constant over the 1995 to 2005 period, export demand would have been 0.6% to 1.8% 
higher in the 10 countries studied.  The impact is somewhat larger when excluding resource 
intensive industries or when focusing on industries in which China’s revealed comparative 
advantage appears to be strongest (apparel, footwear, electronics, toys).  For developing 
countries highly specialized in manufacturing, it appears China’s expansion has represented only 
a modest negative shock.   
  It is important to note that our results do not represent a general equilibrium analysis of 
China’s impact on other developing economies.  China’s export growth may have increased the 
number of product varieties available to these countries, thereby improving consumer welfare 
(Broda and Weinstein, 2005), or had positive effects on the demand for non-manufacturing 
output.  Our approach does not account for changes in consumer welfare associated with changes 
in product variety or non-manufacturing prices.  Nevertheless, the results give a sense of the 
extent to which China is in competition with other large developing country exporters for market 
share abroad.   5
  By way of conclusion, in section 5, we discuss what China’s continued growth may mean 
for manufacturing-oriented developing countries. 
 
2.  Empirical Specification 
  Consider a standard monopolistic model of international trade, as in Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) or Feenstra (2004).  Let there be J countries and N manufacturing sectors, 
where each sector consists of a large number of product varieties.  All consumers have identical 
Cobb-Douglas preferences over CES sectoral composites of product varieties, where in each sector 
n there are In varieties of n produced, with country j producing Inj varieties.  There are increasing 
returns to scale in the production of each variety.  In equilibrium each variety is produced by a 
monopolistically-competitive firm and In is large, such that the price for each variety is a constant 
markup over marginal cost.  Free entry drives profits to zero, equating price with average cost. 
  Consider the variation in product prices across countries.  We allow for iceberg transport 
costs in shipping goods between countries and for import tariffs.   The cost-including-freight (c.i.f.) 
price of variety i in sector n produced by country j and sold in country k is then 
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where Pinj is the free-on-board (f.o.b.) price of product i in sector n manufactured in country j; σn is 
the constant elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties in sector n; wnj is unit production 
cost in sector n for exporter j; tnk is one plus the ad valorem tariff in importer k on imports of n 
(assumed constant for all exporters that do not share a free trade area with importer k); djk is 
distance between exporter j and importer k; and γn is the elasticity of transport costs with respect to 
distance for goods in sector n.   6
  Given the elements of the model, the total value of exports of goods in sector n by exporter j 
to importer k can be written as, 
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where µn is the expenditure share on sector n and Gnk is the price index for goods in sector n in 
importer k.  Equation (2) reduces to 
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which can be written in log form as 
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Regrouping terms in (3’), and allowing for measurement error in trade values, we obtain 
   njk n nk nj 1n jk 2n jk njk lnX m s ln lnd =θ + + +β τ +β +ε .   (4) 
In equation (4), we see that there are five sets of factors that affect country j’s exports to country k 
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) captures demand shifters in sector n and 
importer k (which are a function of importer k’s income and supply shifters for other countries that 
also export to k); the third term (
1 n
nj nj nj sl n ( I w )
−σ = ) captures supply shifters in sector n for 
exporter j (which reflect exporter j’s production costs and the number of varieties it produces in the 
sector); the fourth and fifth terms (where  1n n 1 β =− σ and  2n n n (1 ) β =γ −σ ) capture trade costs   7
specific to exporter j and importer k (which in the empirical analysis we measure using import 
tariffs, bilateral distance, whether countries share a common language, whether countries share a 
land border, and whether countries belong to a free trade area); and the final term ( njk ε ) is a 
residual.  Exporter j’s shipments to importer k would expand if importer k’s income increases, 
production costs increase or the number of varieties produced decreases in other countries that 
supply importer k, exporter j’s supply capacity expands, or bilateral trade costs decrease. 
  Our first empirical exercise is to estimate equation (4).  Then, we use the coefficient 
estimates to examine the role of China in contributing to changes in import demand in other 
countries.  To motivate this approach, consider import-demand conditions in country k, as embodied 
in the importer dummy variables in (4).  In theory, 
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which captures average expenditure per imported variety by country k in sector n.  Import demand 
conditions in k are a function of income in k, export supply conditions in k’s trading partners 
(embodied in the number of varieties they produce and their production costs), and k’s bilateral 
trade costs.  Average expenditure per variety in country k would decrease if the number of varieties 
produced globally increases (since a given sectoral expenditure level would be spread over more 
varieties) or production costs in other countries increases (which would deflect expenditure away 
from their varieties).  Using (4), we can write (5) as,  
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where  nh 1n 2n ˆˆ ˆ s, , a n d ββ are OLS coefficient estimates from (4).
3  O v e r  t i m e ,  i m p o r t - d e m a n d  
conditions in k will change as its income changes, its bilateral trade costs change, or export-supply 
conditions in its trading partners change.  As China’s export supply capacity in sector n improves 
(due either to increases in the number of varieties it produces or decreases in its production costs), 
average expenditure per imported variety in country k would fall, leading to a decrease in the 
demand for imports from k’s trading partners.   
  Following this logic, we construct the implied change in demand for imports by country k 
associated with changes in China’s export-supply capacity.  Actual import demand conditions in 
sector n for country k at time t are 
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where c indexes China.  Suppose China had experienced no growth in its export-supply capacity 
between time 0 and time t.  The counterfactual import-demand term for country k would then be 
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For each importing country in each sector, we calculate the value, 
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3 One might imagine estimating (4) subject to the constraint in (6).  In practice, imposing such nonlinear constraints 
would greatly complicate the regression analysis.  As a simple check on whether the constraints on the value of mnk 
appear to be satisfied in the data, we estimate equation (6) using OLS (after first estimating (4)), the results for 
which are reported in Table 4.  In most specifications, the coefficient on log income ranges between 0.5 and 1.0 and 
the coefficient on the import price index (constructed from the coefficient estimates) is -0.3 to -0.5.  These 
coefficient signs and magnitudes are roughly consistent with theory.   9
which shows the amount by which import demand in k would have differed at time t had China’s 
export supply capacity remained unchanged between time 0 and time t.   
  We refer to the quantity in (9) as the counterfactual change in import demand in country k 
and sector n.  For each of the 10 developing country exporters, we calculate the weighted average of 
(9) across importers and sectors.  The resulting value is the difference in the demand for a country’s 
exports implied by growth in China’s export-supply capacity.  An exporter will be more exposed to 
China’s growth the more its exports are concentrated in goods for which China’s export-supply 
capacity has expanded and the more it trades with countries with which China has relatively low 
trade costs.  Obviously, this counterfactual exercise is not general-equilibrium in nature, and should 
be interpreted with caution.  Still, it may be useful for gauging which export producers have been 
more exposed to export competition from China. 
  One problem with estimating (4) is that at the sectoral level there is zero trade between 
many country pairs.
4  Tenreyro and Santos Silva (2005) propose a Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PML) estimator to deal with zero observations in the gravity model.  In our application, 
this approach is subject to an incidental-parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002).  While in a 
Poisson model it is straightforward to control for the presence of unobserved fixed effects, it is 
difficult in this and many other nonlinear settings to obtain consistent estimates of these effects.  
Since, at the sectoral level, most exporters trade with no more than a few dozen countries, PML 
estimates of exporter and importer country dummies may be inconsistent.    
  Our approach is to estimate (4) using OLS for a set of medium to large exporters (OECD 
countries plus larger developing countries, which together account for approximately 90% of world 
manufacturing exports) and medium to large importers (which together account for approximately 
90% of world manufacturing imports).  For bilateral trade between larger countries, there are 
                                                 
4 Zero bilateral trade values further complicate estimating (4) subject to the constraint in (6).   10
relatively few zero trade values.  Since we do not account explicitly for zero bilateral trade in the 
data, we are left with unresolved concerns about the consistency of the parameter estimates, which 
the trade literature has only recently begun to address.
5 
 
3.  Gravity Estimation Results 
  The trade data for the analysis come from the UN COMTRADE database and cover 
manufacturing imports over the period 1995 to 2005.  We examine bilateral trade at the four-
digit harmonized system (HS) level for the union of the 40 largest manufacturing export 
industries in each of the 10 developing-country exporters.
6  The 40 industries account for the 
majority of manufacturing exports in the 10 manufacturing exporters, ranging from 71% to 90% 
for 7 of the 10 countries (the Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan) and from 48% to 62% in the 3 others (Hungary, Poland, Thailand).  The tariff data, 
which are based on Robertson (2007), come from the TRAINS database and are the simple 
averages of available tariffs at the 10-digit HS level within each four-digit industry.  We use the 
tariffs that are most applicable to each sector-country pair.  For some country pairs, these are the 
importer’s MFN tariffs, for other pairs (e.g., NAFTA members) it is tariffs governed by a 
regional trade agreement, and for others (e.g., U.S.-Israel) it is tariffs governed by a bilateral 
trade agreement.
7 
  We estimate the gravity equation in (4) on a year-by-year basis, allowing coefficients on 
exporter country dummies, importer country dummies, and trade costs to vary by sector and 
year.  The output from the regression exercise is for each sector a panel of exporter and importer 
country dummy variables, trade-cost coefficients, intercepts, and residuals.  The country-sector 
                                                 
5  See Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007). 
6 Choosing a subset of industries helps keep the dimension of the estimation manageable.  
7 We replace missing tariff data with interpolated values based on non-missing tariff data.  See Robertson (2007).    11
dummies are the deviation from U.S. sectoral mean trade by year (as the U.S. in the excluded 
country in all regressions).  For these coefficients to be comparable across time, the conditioning 
set for a given sector (i.e., the set of comparison countries) must be constant.  For each sector, we 




3.1 Summary of Coefficient Estimates 
  To provide some background on the industries included in the sample, Table 3 shows the 
5 largest industries in terms of manufacturing exports for each of the 10 developing-country 
exporters.  For 9 of the countries (all except Hungary), manufacturing exports are concentrated in 
a handful of industries, with the top 5 industries accounting for at least 20% of merchandise 
exports, and for 5 of the countries, the top 5 industries account for at least 30% of merchandise 
exports.  For 7 of the countries, at least one of their top 5 export industries is also one that 
accounts for at least 2% of China’s manufacturing exports. 
  The regression results for equation (4) involve a large amount of output.  In each year, we 
estimate over 10,000 country-sector exporter coefficients and country-sector importer 
coefficients and over 200 trade-cost coefficients.  To summarize exporter and import dummies 
compactly, Figures 1a and 1b plot kernel densities for the sector-country exporter and importer 
coefficients (where the densities are weighted by sector-country exports or imports).  Figure 1a 
shows that most exporter coefficients are negative, consistent with sectoral exports for most 
countries being below the United States.  Over the sample period, the distribution of exporter 
coefficients shifts to the right, suggesting other countries are catching up to the United States.  
                                                 
8 This restriction may introduce selection bias into the estimation.   12
Vertical lines indicate weighted mean values for China’s exporter coefficients in 1995 (equal to 
0.44) and 2005 (equal to 1.78), which rise in value over time relative to the overall distribution of 
exporter coefficients, suggesting China’s export-supply capacity has improved relative to other 
countries over the sample period.  Evidence we report later supports this finding.  In Figure 1b, 
most importer coefficients are also negative, again indicating sectoral trade values for most 
countries are below those for the United States. 
  To provide further detail on the coefficient estimates, Table 4 gives median values of the 
trade cost elasticities by year, weighted by each sector’s share of world trade.  The estimates are 
in line with results in the literature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).  The coefficient on log 
distance is negative and slightly larger than one in absolute value; adjacency, common language, 
and joint membership in a free trade agreement are each associated with higher levels of bilateral 
trade; and the implied elasticity of substitution (given by the tariff coefficient) is close to 3. 
 
3.2 Export Supply Capabilities in Developing Countries vis-à-vis China 
  Of primary interest is how the 10 countries’ export-supply capacities compare to those of 
China.  Figures 2a-2c plot sectoral export coefficients for each country against exporter 
coefficients for China over the sample period (using sectoral shares of annual manufacturing 
exports in each country as weights).  For each country, there is a positive correlation in its 
sectoral export dummies with China, with the correlation being strongest for Turkey (0.63), 
Romania (0.59), Hungary (0.48), Thailand (0.48), Malaysia (0.47), Poland (0.45), Sri Lanka 
(0.45); somewhat smaller for the Philippines (0.33) and Pakistan (0.32); and weakest for Mexico 
(0.12).  The correlation for Mexico appears to be driven by industries related to petroleum, which 
began the period as major export sectors for the country but have since declined in importance.   13
  The positive correlation in sectoral export coefficients with China suggests that most of 
the large developing countries that specialize in manufacturing have strong export supply 
capabilities in the same sectors in which China is also strong.  In other words, the comparative 
advantage of these countries is closely aligned with that of China.  To the extent that the major 
trading partners of these countries are the same as those of China, they would be exposed to 
export-supply shocks in China, meaning that growth in China would potentially reduce demand 
for the manufacturing exports that they produce and lower their terms of trade. 
  To see how export supply capacities have evolved over time, Figures 3a-3c plot the year-
on-year change in country-sector export dummies for each of the 10 developing countries against 
those for China, weighted by each country’s sectoral trade shares.  Immediately apparent is that 
the range of growth in China’s export-supply capacities is large relative to that of any other 
developing country.  Changes in China’s export dummies take on a wide range of values, while 
none of the 10 countries shows nearly as much variation.  As a consequence, the correlation 
between changes in sectoral export dummies between each country and China is weaker than the 
correlation in levels.  The strongest correlations in changes are for Romania (0.50) and Malaysia 
(0.47); followed by Thailand (0.32), Sri Lanka (0.31), Hungary (0.30), the Philippines (0.30), 
Poland (0.22), and Turkey (0.21); and then by Pakistan (0.16) and Mexico (0.14). 
 
4. Counterfactual Exercises 
  In this section, we compare the change in import demand conditions facing each of the 10 
developing-country exporters under two scenarios, one in which import demand evolved as 
observed in the data (as implied by the coefficient estimates from the gravity model) and a 
second in which we hold constant the change in China’s export-supply capabilities.  This   14
exercise allows us to examine whether China’s growth in export production has represented a 
negative shock to the demand for exports from other developing countries. 
  According to the theory presented in section 2, sectoral import demand in a country is 
affected by its GDP and by its sectoral import price index.  Its price index, in turn, is affected by 
export supply conditions in the countries from which it imports goods, weighted by trade costs with 
these countries.  From equation (8), this yields the following relationship: 
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where  nht nht 1n 2n ˆˆ ˆˆ m, s, , a n d ββ are OLS coefficient estimates of the sectoral importer dummy, the 
sectoral exporter dummy, the tariff elasticity, and the distance elasticity from equation (4).  In 
theory, it should be the case that α1=1 and α2=-1.   
  To verify that the relationships posited by theory are found in the data, Table 5 shows 
coefficient estimates for equation (10).  Departing from equation (10) slightly, we also include 
log population as an explanatory variable (to allow demand to be affected by market size and 
average income), though it is imprecisely estimated in most regressions.  We show specifications 
under alternative weighting schemes and for three sets of industries: all manufacturing industries, 
excluding core resource-intensive industries,
9 and excluding all resource-intensive industries.
10  
Demand conditions in resource-intensive industries may differ from other manufacturing 
industries due to their reliance on primary commodities as inputs. Coefficients on GDP (α1 in 
equation (10)) are all positive and precisely estimated, ranging in value from 0.52 to 1.05.   
Coefficients on the import price index (α2 in (10)) are all negative and precisely estimated, 
                                                 
9 At the two-digit HS level, these industries are beverages, cereals, animal oils and fats, sugar, meat and seafood 
processing, fruit and vegetable processing, tobacco, non-metallic minerals, mineral fuels and oils, and inorganic 
chemicals.  
10 In addition to those industries mentioned in note 9, this excludes organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, 
plastics, rubber, leather products, and wood products.   15
ranging in value from -0.31 to -0.53.  While the coefficient estimates do not exactly match the 
theoretically predictions, they are broadly consistent with the model. 
  The next exercise is to use the coefficient estimates to examine the difference in demand 
for exports faced by the 10 developing country exporters that is associated with the growth in 
China’s export supply capacity.  The first step is to calculate for each importer in each sector the 
value in equation (9), which is, 
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This shows the amount by which average import demand in country k and sector n at time t 
would have differed had China’s export supply capacity (which reflects the number of product 
varieties it produces and its production costs) had remained constant between time 0 and time t.
11  
The second step is to calculate the weighted average value of  nkt nkt mm −  for each of the 10 
developing country exporters, using as weights the share of each importer and sector in a country’s 
total manufacturing exports (where these shares are averages over the sample period).
12 
  Table 6 shows the results from the counterfactual calculation where year 0 corresponds to 
1995 and year t corresponds to 2005.
13  The first column shows results in which we set α2 from 
equation (10) equal to -1, as implied by theory.  In 2005, the difference in export demand ranges 
                                                 
11 An alternative to the counterfactual exercise we propose would be to examine the change in China’s exports 
implied by the change in tariffs facing China over the sample period.  Were China’s economy in steady state, then 
the change in tariffs would be the primary shock affecting the country’s exports.  However, over the sample period 
China very much appears to be an economy in transition to a new steady state, associated with a sectoral and 
regional reallocation of resources brought about by the end of central planning.  Thus, focusing on tariffs alone 
would miss the primary shock to China’s export growth. 
12 In taking this weighted average across industries, we are approximating for the percentage change in imports with 
the log change.  This approximation becomes less precise as the growth in imports becomes larger.  In unreported 
results, we experimented with using the percentage change.  The findings are similar to what we report in Table 6. 
13 Because we do not estimate equation (4) subject to the constraint in equation (6), one needs to be careful in 
interpreting our results.  The counterfactual exercises we report apply to changes in demand conditions rather than 
changes in trade.  Absent imposing the equilibrium conditions implied by the model, we cannot interpret the 
counterfactual exercises as implying how trade would change.   16
from 3.3% in Romania to -1.1% in Sri Lanka, with the Philippines and Mexico among the most 
affected countries and Pakistan and Turkey also among the least affected.  The mean difference 
across countries is 1.6%.  Thus, in the developing countries we consider, demand for exports on 
average would have been 1.6% higher had China’s export-supply capacity remained constant from 
1995 to 2005.  The negative difference for Sri Lanka indicates that China’s export-supply capacities 
declined in the country’s primary export industries (which include tea).  The second column shows 
results in which we set α2 equal to -0.5, which is at the upper end of the coefficient estimates for 
Table 5.  The mean difference in export demand across countries drops to 0.8%.  For no country 
does China represent a negative export demand shock of greater than 1.7%. 
  Columns (3)-(6) repeat the results, excluding resource-intensive industries from the sample.  
China’s comparative advantage appears to lie in labor-intensive activities rather than industries that 
use oil, minerals, timber, or foodstuffs intensively.  In column (3), the mean difference across 
countries is 2.7% (compared to 1.6% in column (1)), indicating that China’s impact is indeed larger 
for industries that do not use resources intensively.  The most affected countries are Pakistan, 
Romania, Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  In column (4), in which the value of α2 is set to -
0.5, the mean difference across countries is 1.3%. 
  Finally, columns (7) and (8) show results when we limit the industries to apparel, footwear, 
electronics, and toys.  These include labor intensive industries (or, in electronics, industries with 
labor intensive stages of production), in which one might imagine that China’s comparative 
advantage is strongest.  For these industries, China’s impact is indeed larger, at least for some 
countries.  The counterfactual increase in export demand would be 3.0% across all countries, with 
values over 4.0% occurring in Romania, Poland, Pakistan, and Mexico.   17
  The counterfactual exercises indicate that had China’s export-supply capacities remained 
unchanged demand for exports would have been modestly larger for other developing countries that 
specialize in manufacturing exports.  To repeat, across all manufacturing industries, the average 
difference in export demand is 0.8% to 1.6%; for non-resource-intensive industries, the average 
difference is 1.3% to 2.7%.  These are hardly large values, suggesting that even for the countries 
that would appear to be most adversely affected by China’s growth it is difficult to find evidence 
that the demand for their exports has been significantly reduced by China’s expansion. 
   
5. Discussion 
  In this paper, we use the gravity model of trade to examine the impact of China’s growth 
on the demand for exports in developing countries that specialize in manufacturing.  China’s 
high degree of specialization in manufacturing makes its expansion a potentially significant 
shock for other countries that are also manufacturing oriented.  Of the 10 developing countries 
we examine, 9 have a pattern of comparative advantage that strongly overlaps with China, as 
indicated by countries’ estimated export-supply capacities.  Yet, despite the observed similarities 
in export patterns, we find that China’s growth represents only a small negative shock in demand 
for the other developing countries’ exports.  While there is anxiety in many national capitals over 
China’s continued export surge, our results suggest China’s impact on the export market share of 
other manufacturing exporters has been relatively small. 
  There are several important caveats to our results.  Our framework and analysis are 
confined to manufacturing industries.  There may be important consequences of China for 
developing-country commodity trade, which we do not capture.  The counterfactual exercises we 
report do not account for general-equilibrium effects.  There could be feedback effects from   18
China’s growth on prices, wages, and the number of product varieties produced that cause us to 
misstate the consequences of such shocks for other developing countries.  There are also 
concerns about the consistency of the coefficient estimates, due to the fact that we do not account 
for why there is zero trade between some countries. 
    19
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Table 1:  Total Exports by Country Group (billions of 2000 USD)  
                  
Exporter 1990  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
      
China 35.9  72.0  89.7 168.2 211.5 250.8 269.4 297.5 296.3 324.8 388.1 389.8 464.1 582.3 749.0 897.7 
Sample of ten 
developing 
country exporters  79.6 155.0 180.3 208.7 266.1 330.0 360.4 389.6 393.6 422.6 489.5 464.5 491.4 554.3 644.4 696.6 
Twelve largest 
industrialized 
exporters 1127.1  1561.6  1889.9 2068.6 2693.9 3273.8 3300.4 3314.6 3299.1 3322.6 3456.9 3186.7 3251.1 3614.6 4175.2 4359.2 
Other exporters 
(developing and 
developed)  371.6 478.6 563.4 627.7 794.3 937.9 1006.6 1034.2 968.4 994.5 1133.7 1086.7 1148.2 1355.7 1642.6 1878.4 
                  
Notes:  Sample of 10 developing country exporters is Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Turkey; the twelve largest industrialized exporters (as of 2005) are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, the U.S. and the U.K.; other exporting nations excludes Hong Kong and Singapore. 











China 88.21 32.28 979  1260.3
Philippines 85.83 22.56 996  75.8
Pakistan 84.96 15.91 531  138.4
Hungary 83.09 23.48 4591  10.2
Mexico 82.65 19.96 5682  97.6
Turkey 80.14 15.48 2915  67.3
Romania 79.85 24.11 1805  22.2
Poland 78.32 18.66 4356  38.4
Malaysia 78.26 30.23 3894  23.0
India 75.30 15.79 458  1015.2
Sri Lanka  74.93 16.12 838  18.9
Thailand 74.23 32.60 2085  61.4
Ukraine 68.89 24.99 691  49.2
Morocco 62.55 17.05 1240  27.9
South Africa  56.22 19.36 3072  43.6
Brazil 54.18 --    3441  173.9
Indonesia 52.15 27.62 842  206.4
Vietnam 46.47 18.47 406  78.4
Senegal 42.64 12.44 424  10.4
Egypt, Arab Rep.  35.69 18.54 1456  67.4
Guatemala 34.53 13.23 1694  11.2
Colombia 34.25 15.49 2039  42.1
Argentina 31.36 19.91 7488  36.9
Zimbabwe 28.34 15.50 586  12.5
Kenya 23.43 11.79 420  30.7
Russian Federation  23.18 17.48 1811  146.0
Kazakhstan 22.61 15.10 1329  15.0
Peru 20.44 15.99 2078  25.9
Cote d'Ivoire  18.17 19.81 621  16.6
Chile 16.15 19.45 4924  15.4
Venezuela, RB  12.70 18.82 4749  24.3
Saudi Arabia  10.61 10.20 9086  20.7
Ecuador 9.93 12.00 1368  12.3
Iran, Islamic Rep.  8.93 12.66 1634  63.6
Syrian Arab Republic  8.36 10.30 1128  16.8
 
Notes:  This table shows data for all countries with more than 10 million inhabitants and per 
capita GDP greater than $400 and less than $10,000 (in 2000 prices).  Figures are averages over 
the period 2000-2005.   22
Table 3:  Major Export Industries in 10 Developing Countries  
 
Country HS4  Description  Mfg  rank
Share of Country's 
Total Exports 
Share of China's 
Total Exports 
Hungary 6204  Female  Suits  1  0.035  0.026 
Hungary 6403  Footwear  2  0.026  0.024 
Hungary 8544  Wire  3  0.023  0.003 
Hungary 2710  Non-Crude  Oil  4  0.022  0.013 
Hungary  8708  Motor Vehicle Parts  5  0.020  0.001 
          
Malaysia 2709  Crude  Oil  1  0.103  0.048 
Malaysia 8542  Electric  Circuits  2  0.087  0.001 
Malaysia 4403  Rough  Wood  3  0.060  0.001 
Malaysia 8527  Receivers  4  0.050  0.023 
Malaysia 4407  Sawn  Wood  5  0.038  0.001 
          
Mexico 2709  Crude  Oil  1  0.219  0.048 
Mexico 8703  Motor  Vehicles  2  0.066  0.000 
Mexico  8708  Motor Vehicle Parts  3  0.054  0.001 
Mexico 8544  Wire  4  0.041  0.003 
Mexico 8407  Engines  5  0.036  0.000 
          
Pakistan 5205  Cotton  Yarn  1  0.186  0.002 
Pakistan 5201  Cotton  2  0.097  0.004 
Pakistan 5208  Cotton  Fabrics  3  0.063  0.010 
Pakistan 6302  House  Linens  4  0.061  0.010 
Pakistan 4203  Leather  Apparel  5  0.056  0.011 
          
Philippines 8542 Electric  Circuits  1  0.124  0.001 
Philippines 1513 Coconut  Oil  2  0.037  0.000 
Philippines  8471  Data Processing Machines  3  0.031  0.005 
Philippines 2603 Copper  4  0.029  0.000 
Philippines 7403 Refined  Copper  5  0.027  0.000 
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Table 3:  Continued 
 
Country HS4  Description  Rank 
Share of Country's 
Total Exports 
Share of China's 
Total Exports 
Poland 2701  Coal  1  0.072  0.008 
Poland 7403  Refined  Copper  2  0.047  0.000 
Poland 6204  Female  Suits  3  0.030  0.026 
Poland 9403  Furniture  NES  4  0.025  0.003 
Poland  6203  Not Knit Male Suits  5  0.022  0.017 
         
Romania 9403  Furniture  NES  1  0.079  0.003 
Romania  7208  Iron and Steel  2  0.076  0.003 
Romania 6204  Female  Suits  3  0.048  0.026 
Romania 2710  Non-Crude  Oil  4  0.046  0.013 
Romania 9401  Seats  5  0.045  0.002 
         
Sri Lanka  902  Tea  1  0.079  0.003 
Sri Lanka  6204  Female Suits  2  0.068  0.026 
Sri Lanka  6206  Female Blouses  3  0.062  0.015 
Sri Lanka  7103  Precious Stones  4  0.050  0.000 
Sri Lanka  6203  Male Suits  5  0.043  0.017 
         
Thailand  8473  Office Mach Parts  1  0.049  0.005 
Thailand  8471  Data Processing Machines  2  0.048  0.005 
Thailand 4001  Rubber  3  0.039  0.000 
Thailand 8542  Electric  Circuits  4  0.037  0.001 
Thailand 1701  Sugar  (Solid)  5  0.028  0.001 
         
Turkey 6110  Sweaters  1  0.049  0.031 
Turkey 6204  Female  Suits  2  0.048  0.026 
Turkey 4203  Leather  Apparel  3  0.045  0.011 
Turkey 6104  Knit  Female  Suits  4  0.042  0.003 
Turkey 2401  Tobacco  5  0.041  0.001 
 
Notes:  This table shows for each country the five largest manufacturing industries in terms of 
exports, the industry’s share in the country’s total merchandise exports, and the industry’s share 
in China’s merchandise exports (each averaged for the period 1995-2005).   24









1995 -1.169 0.732 0.484  0.325  -3.173 
1996 -1.174 0.725 0.470  0.313  -3.122 
1997 -1.174 0.732 0.468  0.314  -3.109 
1998 -1.174 0.761 0.494  0.339  -3.097 
1999 -1.171 0.766 0.479  0.337  -3.074 
2000 -1.171 0.739 0.432  0.306  -3.051 
2001 -1.176 0.744 0.447  0.311  -3.030 
2002 -1.176 0.748 0.457  0.323  -3.059 
2003 -1.178 0.740 0.448  0.317  -3.031 
2004 -1.180 0.733 0.436  0.307  -2.999 
2005 -1.181 0.715 0.412  0.289  -2.964 
 
Notes:  Coefficient estimates are expressed as trade-value-weighted median values for 
manufacturing industries.   25
Table 5:  Correlates of Country Sector Import Dummies 
 
  Without Trade Weights  With Trade Weights 

















log GDP  0.939  0.983 1.045 0.529 0.520 0.664
 (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03)
       
log population  -0.127  -0.125 -0.228 0.041 0.062 -0.032
 (0.05)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
       
log import  -0.358  -0.386 -0.307 -0.531 -0.477 -0.303
price index  (0.05)  (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.03)
       
R Squared  0.376  0.378 0.499 0.278 0.184 0.520
       
N 128942  108097 84724 128942 108097 84724
 
Notes:  This table shows regression of country-sector import dummies on log GDP, log 
population, and the log import price index.  Standard errors (clustered by industry and year) are 
in parentheses.  The sample spans 1995-2005 for one of three groups of industries (all 
manufacturing, excluding core resource intensive industries, excluding all resource intensive 
industries).  All regressions include sector-year dummy variables.  Weighted regressions use the 
share of a sector in a country’s manufacturing exports as weights. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 α= -1  -0.5 -1 -0.5 -1 -0.5 -1  -0.5
Hungary  0.025 0.013 0.028 0.014 0.029 0.015 0.018 0.009
          
Malaysia  0.019 0.010 0.032 0.016 0.034 0.017 0.020 0.010
          
Mexico  0.002 0.001 0.032 0.016 0.034 0.017 0.042 0.021
          
Pakistan  0.014 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.041 0.021 0.049 0.025
          
Philippines 0.028 0.014 0.028 0.014 0.032 0.016 0.015 0.008
          
Poland  0.018 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.052 0.026
          
Romania  0.033 0.017 0.034 0.017 0.040 0.020 0.055 0.028
          
Sri  Lanka  -0.011 -0.006 -0.016 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003
          
Thailand  0.017 0.009 0.019 0.010 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.012
          
Turkey  0.018 0.009 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.033 0.017
          
Mean  0.016 0.008 0.021 0.011 0.027 0.013 0.030 0.015
 
Notes: This table shows how manufacturing export demand would have differed in 2005 for a 
given country had China’s export-supply capacities remained unchanged between 1995 and 
2005, based on the methodology outlined in the text. 
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Figure 1a:  Estimated Sector-Country Exporter Coefficients, Selected Years 
 

















Figure 1b:  Estimated Sector-Country Importer Coefficients, Selected Years   29
Figure 2a:  Sectoral Export Coefficients for Individual Developing Countries and China 
 






















































































































































Figure 2b:  Sectoral Export Coefficients for Individual Developing Countries and China  
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Figure 2c:  Sectoral Export Coefficients for Individual Developing Countries and China 
 












































































Figure 3a:  Changes in Sectoral Export Coefficients, Individual Countries and China 
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Figure 3b:  Changes in Sectoral Export Coefficients, Individual Countries and China 
 











































































































































Figure 3c:  Changes in Sectoral Export Coefficients, Individual Countries and China 
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